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Trust is full of puzzle and paradox. Trust is both rational and emotional. Trust can go beyond 
calculative self-interest, but has its limits. People may want to trust, while they may also feel 
threatened by it. If trust is not in place prior to a relationship, on the basis of institutions, prior 
experience, or reputation, it has to be built up, in specific relations. For that one needs to learn, in the 
sense of building empathy, and perhaps a certain degree of identification. In an attempt at a better 
understanding of the puzzles and processes of trust, this chapter applies the perspective of ‘embodied 
cognition’, and insights from mental ‘framing’ and decision heuristics from social psychology. 
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As commemorated during the conference on ‘La structure cognitive de la confiance’, to which this 
present paper was a contribution, Georg Simmel proposed that trust is a mixture of rationality and 
feeling: it is based on certain amount of rational assessment, but also entails a leap of faith beyond 
that. This seems related to the ‘paradox of information’ associated with trust (Pagden 1988). On the 
one hand trust requires lack of information: if one were certain about future behaviour, we would no 
longer speak of trust. On the other hand, trust is based on information, in attributions of motives and 
competencies to people, based on observed or reported behaviour. 
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of how this mixture of rationality and feeling, 
assessment and faith, and information and uncertainty may ‘work’, in the process of the making and 
breaking of trust. It employs the perspective of ‘embedded cognition’ (Merleau-Ponty 1942, 1964), 
which has recently obtained further foundations from recent neuro-science (Edelman 1987, 1992, 
Damasio 1995, 2003, Lakoff and Johnson 1999). According to this perspective, cognition is rooted in 
brain and body, which are in turn embedded in their external environment. Here, cognition denotes a 
broad range of mental activity, including proprioception, perception, sense making, categorization, 
inference, value judgments, emotions, and feelings.  
One core assumption is that people perceive, interpret and evaluate the world according to mental 
categories that they have developed in interaction with their social and physical environment. This is 
consistent with the view of ‘symbolic interactionism’ from sociology (G.H. Mead). It is particularly 
relevant to trust, which builds up or breaks down in processes of interaction between people. A second 
assumption is that rationality and emotions, and mind and body, are intertwined (see also Simon 1983, 
Nussbaum 2001). This goes against the body-mind dualism of Descartes, and is more in sympathy 
with the thought of Descartes’ contemporary Spinoza (Damasio 2003). Events call forth emotions, 
rooted in the body, which give rise to feelings, which may lead to reflective thought, which may 
modify emotions and may yield a critical analysis of events. This also is of particular relevance to 
trust, where emotions play an important role in the way that trust builds up or breaks down in an 
emotion-laden perception and assessment of threats and risks. For a further understanding of how this 
works, we will employ insights from social psychology.   
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In this paper, trust is defined as perceived vulnerability to the actions of others, with the possibility 
of ‘things going wrong’, combined with the belief that they will not go (seriously) wrong.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it gives a summary of basic notions of trust on which it builds, 
adopted from the literature (Nooteboom 2002). Second, it gives a further discussion of notions of 
knowledge and learning used, from the perspective of embodied cognition. Third, it analyses the 
process of trust building as a process of learning. For a closer analysis of how this works, it next 
employs insights derived from the theory of framing (Lindenberg 1998, 2003) and decision heuristics 
from social psychology (Bazerman 1998, Tversky and Kahneman 1983).     
  
Basic features of trust 
 
In line with Nooteboom (2002), trust is here taken as a four-place predicate: the trustor (1) trusts a 
trustee (2) in on or more aspects of behaviour (3), under certain circumstances (4). Trustees can be 
individual people, but also collectives, such as organizations, and institutions. The relation between 
trust in people and trust in organization depends on the position and roles that people have in an 
organization (Ring and van de Ven 1992, 1994) and on the organization’s mode of coordinating 
behaviour. Concerning aspects of behaviour that one may trust, it is customary to distinguish trust in 
competence (ability to conform to expectations) and trust in intentions (to perform in good faith 
according to the best of competence). Competence includes technical and cognitive competence. Trust 
in intentions requires commitment, i.e. attention to possible mishaps, and absence of opportunism. In 
the literature, absence of opportunism has been called ‘benevolence’, ‘goodwill’ and ‘solidarity’. The 
dependence of trust on circumstances entails that trust is limited: one may trust someone (in 
competence or intentions), under some conditions but not in others that go beyond competence or 
resistance to temptations of opportunism.  
Concerning the sources of trust, there are psychological causes and rational reasons. Psychological 
causes include emotions and may entail reflexes or automatic response. Rational reasons entail 
inference, on the basis of perceived behaviour, of someone’s trustworthiness. An important question is 
how those two sources of trust are related. Can we separate rationality from emotions and feelings? As 
indicated above, in this article the view is that they cannot be, and that emotions, rationality and 
feelings are intertwined. According to Damasio (2003), perceptions may trigger emotions, which in 
turn yield feelings, which may yield thoughts that lead to some constraint on emotions. The question is 
how this works, in more detail. Assessment of someone’s trustworthiness, on the basis of observed or 
reported behaviour, is limited by uncertainty and bounded rationality, and is mediated by mental 
heuristics, in perception and attribution of motives and competences of people. Action is based on 
behavioural routines and their selection, according to decision heuristics. Such heuristics of inference 
and decision are known from social psychology (Tversky and Kahneman 1983, Bazerman 1998, Smith 
and Mackie 2000), and will be used in this chapter. Nevertheless, judgements of trustworthiness can 
be more or less rational, in efforts to avoid ‘jumping to conclusions’, to be reasonable, and to extend 
benefit of the doubt to people when trouble occurs. How the psychology of trust may work will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
The next question is why people might be trustworthy. Here, we focus on intentional 
trustworthiness, in particular why people might not act opportunistically. A distinction is made 
between  ‘micro’ foundations that are specific to a relationship, and ‘macro’, institution-based 
foundations that lie in the social environment of a relationship. The distinction between macro and 
micro sources is also known as the distinction between ‘universalistic’ or ‘generalized’ sources versus 
‘particularistic’ sources, made by Deutsch (1973: 55), and between impersonal and personalized sources 
made by Shapiro (1987) and goes back to the work of Parsons. A distinction is also made between self-
interested foundations and foundations that go beyond calculative self-interest. In self-interested 
foundations, trustworthiness may be based on control or deterrence. The trustor may control 
opportunities for opportunism (‘opportunity control’), or material incentives (‘incentive control’). 
Opportunity control may be based on legal coercion (‘macro’) or on hierarchical ‘fiat’, within a 
relationship (‘micro’). Beyond self-interest, and beyond control by the trustor, trustworthiness may be 
based on socially inculcated values, norms and habits (‘macro’), or on personal feelings of empathy or 
identification, or routinization of conduct in a relationship (‘micro’). Empathy entails the ability to 
understand another’s ‘way of thinking’, without sharing it (having mental models of other people’s 
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mental models), and identification entails that one ‘thinks the same way’ (having similar mental 
models). For trust, one needs empathy, but not necessarily identification. One needs to understand 
‘what makes others tick’, without neccessarily ‘ticking in the same way’. Empathy is needed to have a 
sense of the limits of trustworthiness, depending on circumstances. An overview of foundations of 
trustworthiness is given in Table 1.   
 
--------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------    
 
Note that in Table 1 reputation is included in the self-interested foundations of trustworthiness. 
Here, one behaves well because bad behaviour would get known in relevant communities, whereby 
one would forego possibly profitable options for future relationships. 
Concerning routinization (see Table 1), Herbert Simon a long time ago showed that routines have 
survival value due to bounded rationality, in the sense of bounded capacity for reflective thought. 
Routines allow us to reserve our scarce capacity of ‘focal awareness’ (Polanyi 1962), in rational, 
calculative thought, for conditions that are new and demand priority. When things go well for a while 
in a relationship, one tends to take at least some of it for granted. One may no longer think of 
opportunities for opportunism open to a partner, or to oneself. On the basis of experience in relations, 
trustworthiness is assumed until evidence to the contrary emerges. In other words, trust is a ‘default’. 
The possibility of opportunism is relegated to ‘subsidiary awareness’ (Polanyi 1962). Generally, when 
something out of the ordinary occurs, our awareness shifts from subsidiary to ‘focal’ and we look 
critically at what is going on. As Simon (1983) pointed out, we need emotions of danger and 
excitement to catapult danger or opportunity into focal awareness. Next, in case of trouble we must 
control emotions to give the partner the benefit of the doubt, allowing for mishaps, rather than 
immediately assume the worst (opportunism). In this way, routine behaviour is not necessarily blind, 
or more accurately: it is not unconditional.  
According to the analysis so far, trust may be based on control (coercion, incentives). However, 
several authors have recognised that trust goes beyond control, in ‘goodwill’ or ‘benevolence’ (see e.g. 
the special issue of Organization Studies on ‘Trust and control in organizational relations’, 22/2, 
2001). As noted by Maguire et. al. (2001: 286), if we do not include the latter, we conflate trust and 
power. Control or deterrence is part of calculative self-interest, but benevolence is not. Many authors 
feel that control is foreign to the notion of trust, and that ‘genuine’ trust is based on other, more social 
and personal foundations of trustworthiness. Therefore, trust has been defined as the expectation that a 
partner will not engage in opportunistic behaviour, even in the face of short-term opportunities and 
incentives (Bradach and Eccles 1984, Chiles and McMackin 1996). To avoid confusion, here the term 
‘reliance’ is used to cover all foundations of trustworthiness, and ‘trust’ is used for motives that go 
beyond self-interest.  
While trust can go beyond calculative self-interest, in benevolence, it does, and generally should, 
have its limits. Blind, unconditional trust is generally unwise. Even benevolent people need to guard 
their self-interest, and not excessively cynical to assume that resistance to temptations to opportunism 
or betrayal is limited. Managers may be expected to cheat to the extent that their firm is under pressure 
of survival in competition. An illustration is the ENRON affair. When the overriding survival criterion 
of a firm is short-term (quarterly) profit, and an economic slump erodes it, the firm may feel 
irresistible pressure to cheat on the figures. Thus, one should maintain awareness of conditions where 
trustworthiness may be put under too large a strain.  
Yet, as noted before, within limits trust can become routinized and be taken for granted. One does 
not continually scrutinise behaviour and conditions for opportunities for opportunism, for oneself or 
one’s partner, until they are felt to be excessive. As noted before, in view of uncertainties concerning 
motives and conditions, trust can only operate as a default: one assumes trustworthiness, within 
boundaries, until evidence of its failure becomes manifest, and then one adjusts the limits of trust. In 
other words: one must trust to learn even about trustworthiness. If one only trusted under certainty one 
would never trust, thereby robbing oneself of the opportunity to learn about trustworthiness and its 
limits.  
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One must learn to trust, in finding out how far trustworthiness goes, in different aspects of 
behaviour. How far does someone’s (or a firm’s) competence go? Where are the weak spots? How 
robust is competence under adverse conditions? How strong are pressures of competition, and what 
slack of resources does a firm have under adversity before it succumbs?  
After this summary of the ‘basics’ of trust, this article focuses on the ‘trust process’. The question is 
on what heuristics of attribution and decision trust and trustworthiness are based, and how this works 
out in the build-up and break-down of trust.  
 
Knowledge and learning 
 
As indicated in the introduction, this chapter builds on the assumption that knowledge is physically 
embodied and socially embedded. People perceive, interpret and evaluate the world according to 
mental categories (or frames or mental models) that they have developed in interaction with their 
social and physical environment, in ‘embodied realism’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1999), with the adaptive, 
selectionist construction of neural nets (Edelman 1987, 1992). The term ‘knowledge’ here is a broad 
one, and denotes any mental activity, including perception and value judgements. In other words, we 
see cognition and emotion (such as fear, suspicion) and body and mind as closely linked (Merleau-
Ponty 1964, Simon 1983, Damasio 1995, Nussbaum 2001). The notion that cognition is embedded, 
arising from interaction with the environment, goes back to Vygotsky (1962) and Piaget (1970, 1974), 
with their idea that ‘intelligence is internalized action’. In sociology, the idea that cognition arises 
from interaction of people with their (especially social) environment arises, in particular, in the 
‘symbolic interactionism’ proposed by G.H. Mead (1934, 1984).  
 As a result of differences in physical and cultural environments and individual paths of life that are 
embodied in cognition, perception, interpretation and evaluation are path-dependent and idiosyncratic 
to a greater or lesser extent. Different people see and experience the world differently to the extent that 
they have developed in different physical, social and personal surroundings and have not interacted 
with each other. In other words, past experience determines absorptive capacity, and there is greater or 
lesser ‘cognitive distance’ between people (Nooteboom 1999).  
 This yields both an opportunity and a problem. Because one cannot ‘climb down from one’s mind’ to 
assess whether one’s knowledge is properly ‘hooked on to the world’, the variety of perception and 
understanding offered by other people, on the basis of a variety of experience, is the only source one has 
for correcting one’s errors. Greater distance yields greater novelty value. However, greater distance also 
makes it more difficult to understand each other and to agree on aims and procedures. If effectiveness of 
learning by interaction depends on the mathematical product of increasing novelty and decreasing 
understandability, it has an inverted U-shaped relationship with cognitive distance. This entails a 
difference between crossing cognitive distance (in understanding people who think differently) and 
reducing it (thinking more alike). This is the same as the difference between empathy and identification, 
discussed before. As relationships last longer, cognitive distance is reduced, and identification takes 
place, especially if the relationship is exclusive, i.e. there are no outside relationships. That is good for 
trust building but bad for learning. As a result, there is also an inverted U-shaped relation between 
learning and the duration of a relationship. First, learning increases due to increased understanding, but 
then learning declines for lack of cognitive distance, in identification. For empirical tests of the 
hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance, see Wuyts et. al. (2003).  
 According to Damasio (2003), events, appraised in perception and interpretation, trigger emotions, 
seen as bodily responses, which may yield automatic response, but also yield feelings that may lead on to 
critical reflection on the perceived event, its interpretation, consequences, and possible response.    
 
How to begin, to adapt and to end a relationship?   
 
Let us turn to a more detailed analysis of the process of trust development. First, I turn to rational 
analysis, and psychological processes will be elaborated later. As a transaction relation unfolds in 
time, one can accumulate more or less reliable information about trustworthiness. And such experience 
can be communicated in reputation mechanisms. The sociological literature gives extensive 
instructions how to infer intentional trustworthiness from observed behaviour (Deutsch 1973). Did the 
partner act not only according to the letter but also to the spirit of the agreement? Did he give timely 
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warnings about unforeseen changes or problems? Was he open about relevant contingencies, and 
truthful about his dealings with others who might constitute a threat? Did he defect to more attractive 
alternatives at the earliest opportunity? Or to use Hirschman’s (1970) notions of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’: 
how much voice rather than exit did he exhibit? 
 In interaction, partners may get to understand each other better, which enables a better judgement of 
trustworthiness, in ‘knowledge based trust’. In ongoing interaction they may first develop insight in 
each other’s cognitive frames, in empathy. This does not entail that they always agree. There may be 
sharp disagreements, but those are combined with a willingness to express and discuss them more or 
less openly, in ‘voice’, extending mutual benefit of the doubt. As a result, conflicts may deepen the 
relationship rather than breaking it. Next, partners may develop shared cognitive frames, by which 
they may identify with each other's goals, in ‘identification based trust’, with understanding or even 
sympathy for weaknesses and mistakes (McAllister 1995, Lewicki and Bunker 1996).  
How, then, does trust develop if there was none before, when there is no basis for ex-ante trust 
based on earlier experience? The assumption here is that vulnerability cannot be avoided: to achieve 
its purpose the relationship entails risks of dependence. As indicated earlier (in Table 1), one solution 
might be to rely on reputation mechanisms. Zucker (1986) suggested that one may infer 
trustworthiness on the basis of social characteristics, such as upbringing and membership of social 
groups (such as families, clubs, associations of trade or profession, see also Putnam 2000). Let us 
suppose, then, that neither reputation nor reliable characteristics are available.  
One view is that under those conditions one can only start with control (Lewicki and Bunker 1996), 
on the basis of contracts, for example, and then shift to trust as knowledge and empathy grow. One 
problem with that is that in learning and innovation there is likely to be too much uncertainty to 
specify the conditions of an extended contract, and limited opportunities for monitoring contract 
execution. Another possibility is develop the relation in a careful balance of mutual dependence, so 
that there is a threat of retaliation when temptation towards opportunism arises. Another possibility 
would be to start with small steps, with limited risk, and expand vulnerability as trust grows. One 
problem with that is that it may take too long. Under present market conditions there is often a need 
for speed. To reduce risk and to speed up relationship development, one may also profit from the 
service of specialized intermediaries.  
There are a host of different types of intermediaries or go-betweens whose task it is to help judge 
performance and to provide intermediation or arbitration in conflicts. Shapiro (1987) called these 
intermediaries ‘guardians of trust’, Zucker (1986) saw them as part of ‘institutions based trust’, and 
Fukuyama (1995) used the term ‘intermediate communities’. Many of these serve to develop and police 
technical or professional standards, with certification systems. There are also roles for go-betweens as 
consultants in the management of inter-organizational relationships (Nooteboom 2002), in offering 
arbitration or mediation in conflict, assessing the value of information before it is traded, creating 
mutual understanding (helping to cross cognitive distance), monitoring information flow as a guard 
against the spillover of sensitive information, guarding hostages, supporting a reputation system. A 
further, and perhaps most crucial, role is to act as an intermediary in the building of trust. Trust 
relations are often entered with partners who are trusted partners of someone you trust. If X trusts Y 
and Y trusts Z, then X may rationally give trust in Z a chance. X needs to feel that Y is able to judge well 
and has no intention to lie about his judgment. This can speed up the building of trust between strangers, 
which might otherwise take too long. Intermediation in the first small and ginger steps of cooperation, 
to ensure that they are successful, can be very important in the building of a trust relation. The 
intermediary can perform valuable services in protecting trust when it is still fragile: to eliminate 
misunderstanding and allay suspicions when errors or mishaps are mistaken as signals of opportunism. 
He may also help in the timely and least destructive disentanglement of relations. To eliminate 
misunderstanding, to prevent acrimonious and mutually damaging battles of divorce, a go-between can 
offer valuable services, to help in ‘a voice type of exit’. 
    
Framing 
 
For a deeper analysis, we need to know more about how, in the building and break-down of trust, 
people make inferences from observed behaviour, and how they act on them. In particular, we want to 
know how rationality and emotions are combined, and how people go beyond calculative self-interest 
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and yet refrain from blind, unconditional trust. Here, we employ insights from the theory of framing 
and from social psychology.  
The basic assumptions of framing are the following. People act on the basis of cognitive frames 
with different motives or goals. At any moment one frame tends to be salient or ‘in focus’ (Polanyi) 
while others are in ‘subsidiary’ awareness. Mental frames are connected with repertoires of action, 
such as threat, attack, retaliation, defense, surrender, withdrawal, avoidance, approach, offer, receipt, 
negotiation, etc. In human relations, two basic repertoires of action may be those of ‘voice’ or ‘exit’, 
proposed by Hirschman (1970). Frames, together with situational conditions, trigger behavioural 
routines that enact the frame. Selection and switches of frames are typically based on emotions, 
triggered by events in specific contexts of action. Emotions may yield automated, reflexive behaviour, 
or may lead on to feelings that give rise to rational considerations by which emotions may to some 
degree be held in check or modified. The importance of emotions here is that they form the trigger of 
frame switching.  
Lindenberg (2003) proposed the following frames :  
- ‘Guarding one’s resources’, i.e. focusing on survival or self-preservation 
- ‘Acting appropriately’ (Lindenberg 2003), i.e. according to norms of behaviour (in a 
community) or shared values (in a specific relationship), gaining social legitimation  
- ‘Acting as a friend’ 
- ‘Hedonics’, i.e. giving in to urges of gratification. 
In social psychology, Smith and Mackie (2003) recognized three basic motives of human 
behaviour: striving for mastery, seeking connections with others, valuing yourself and connected 
others. Damasio (2003) refers to Spinoza’s thought in terms of two basic human drives: towards self 
perpetuation, which seems similar to Lindenberg’s ‘guarding one’s resources’, and towards perfection, 
which seems similar to what Smith and Mackie recognized as a ‘striving for mastery’. Damasio 
proposed a hierarchy of bodily and mental regulation, as illustrated in figure 1. Here, the ‘drives’, 
which Spinoza called ‘appetites’, of hunger, thirst, sex, etc., seem similar to Lindenberg’s ‘hedonics’.  
 
----------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Here, for maximum simplicity, but in broad agreement with the typologies indicated above, I 
assume two basic sets or families of frames: self-directed (including concern for survival, resources, 
gratification) and other-directed (acting appropriately, as a friend, connections with others, social 
legitimation). Note that this brings us close to the classification of sources of (intentional) reliability in 
Table 1.  
Stability of relations depends on frame stability, which depends on how salient a frame is, which 
depends on how strongly it is held, on what frames are subsidiary and on the extent to which they are 
complements or substitutes to the salient frame (Lindenberg 2003). If, for example, the salient frame is 
to act in regard for others, and the frame of self-interest is subsidiary, they complement each other 
when self-interest is served by collaboration with others. When self-interest is threatened, beyond 
some tolerance level, the stability of an other-directed frame is precarious. This is how I reconstruct 




The question now is what heuristics are used in these processes of the formation, selection and 
enactment of frames. Here, I turn to decision heuristics proposed in social psychology by Bazerman 
(1998):  
 
- Representativeness heuristic: the likelihood of an event is assessed by its similarity to stereotypes of 
similar occurrences.  
- Availability heuristic: people assess the probability and likely causes of an event by the degree to which 
instances of it are ‘readily available’ in memory, i.e. are vivid, laden with emotion, familiar, recent 
and recognizable. Less available events and causes are neglected. 
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- Anchoring and adjustment. Judgement is based on some initial or base value (‘anchor’) from previous 
experience or social comparison, plus incremental adjustment from that value. People have been 
shown to stay close even to random anchors that bear no systematic relation to the issue at hand. 
First impressions can influence the development of a relation for a long time.  
 
 These heuristics serve to give more substance to the notion of absorptive capacity, i.e. the ability to 
perceive and interpret phenomena, and to the claim, made in embodied cognition, that rationality and 
emotions are intertwined. The heuristics are not rational in a calculative sense (calculative rationality). 
Indeed, they serve to show how bounded rationality works. However, they are ‘adaptively rational’ in the 
sense of contributing to survival under uncertainty and bounded rationality, and the need, in many 
situations, to decide and act quickly (adaptive rationality). Nevertheless, they can lead to error, as will be 
discussed. In the elaboration of these heuristics I present what I make of them, from the perspective of 
embodied cognition and framing theory, and this may deviate from established practice in social 
psychology.  
 Prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1983) has demonstrated that people are not risk-neutral, and 
tend to be risk-taking when a decision is framed in terms of loss, and risk-averse when it is framed in 
terms of gain. This entails that people will accept a greater risk of conflict when they stand to incur a loss 
than when they stand to obtain a gain. As a result, the frame of guarding resources, or going for material 
self-interest, splits up into a frame of loss and a frame of gain. Related to this effect is the endowment 
effect: people often demand more money to sell what they have than they would be prepared to pay to 
get it. In the first case one wants to cover for loss.  
 Yet another psychological mechanism is that in violation of rational behaviour sunk costs, such as 
sacrifices made in a relationship, are not seen as bygones that should be ignored in an assessment of 
future costs and benefits. They are seen as sacrifices that would be seen as in vain if one pulls out after 
having incurred them. This yields what is known as non-rational escalation of commitment. It is 
associated with cognitive dissonance: cutting one’s losses and pulling out would entail an admission of 
failure, of having made a bad decision in the past. Deutsch (1973) gave the example of the US finding it 
increasingly difficult to pull out of Viet Nam as the number of killed soldiers accumulated. The 
phenomenon is confirmed in empirical research, which shows that when the decision is to be made by 
someone not involved in the initial commitment, or when the threat of an admission of failure is 
removed, the rational decision to pull out is made. Again, one cannot say that this mechanism is always 
bad, because it also demonstrates perseverance in the face of setbacks, which can be a good thing, and is 
in fact a trait of many a successful innovating entrepreneur. This phenomenon can be connected with the 
effect of a loss frame versus a gain frame. The person, or group, that made the initial decision 
experiences a loss frame, with the inclination to accept further risk in order to prevent acceptance of the 
loss. The decision maker who enters fresh experiences a gain frame, to make a decision that will offer 
profit or prevent further loss in the future, regardless of past sunk costs.  
 Evolutionary psychologists claim that certain psychological features or mechanisms are ‘in our 
genes’ as a result of evolution (Barkow et. al. 1992). They emerged as features that gave selective or 
reproductive advantage, over the millions of years that the human species evolved in hunter-gatherer 
societies. For example, survival required the basic ability to identify objects and movement, to 
categorize natural kinds (plants, animals), distinguish the animate from the inanimate, and natural 
kinds from artefacts (Tooby and Cosmides 1992: 71). On top of that, it requires the ability to recognise 
objects, judge speed and distance, to avoid predators and to catch prey (Tooby and Cosmides 1992: 
110). Survival also requires mother-infant emotion communication signals (Tooby and Cosmides 
1992: 39). Such instincts contribute to the heuristics of availability and representatives, in our framing 
of the world.   
These heuristics and principles from social and evolutionary psychology are consistent with the 
perspective of embodied cognition, and indeed serve to elucidate and extend it, in their integration 
with emotions, their pragmatic role in survival under conditions of radical uncertainty, and their 
embedding in processes of practical action.  
 
Application to trust 
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In my interpretation, the representativeness heuristic constitutes our repertoire for categorization, i.e. 
what we can attend to, in our absorptive capacity. There is a connection with the role of ‘prototypes’ or 
‘exemplars’ in language and categorization (Rosch 1978, Nooteboom 2000). Since definitions can 
seldom offer necessary and sufficient conditions for categorization, and meaning is context-dependent 
and open-ended, allowing for variation and change, we need prototypes. Prototypes are salient exemplars 
of a class that guide categorization by assessing similarity to the prototype. We try to fit or assimilate 
observed behaviour into prototypes in our cognitive repertoire, and when we recognise some features 
as fitting, we tend to attribute remaining, unobserved attributes that belong to the prototype. The 
mechanism of attributing unobserved characteristics upon recognition of observed ones enables fast 
pattern recognition, which is conducive to survival. The downside of the representativeness heuristic is 
that it also yields prejudice, in the premature, erroneous application of stereotypes, in mistaken 
attributions. In the present framework, the representativeness heuristic regulates the cognitive content of 
frames, in terms of the categories that they employ. In the context of trust, I see the representativeness 
heuristic as providing benchmarks, in the form of  prototypes, for efficient, fast identification of 
trustworthy and untrustworthy behaviour, and guidelines or exemplars for trustworthy behaviour. In 
organizations, such prototypes for trust are often part of organizational culture. An example is the 
following. In her analysis of ‘trust and trouble’ in organizations, Six (2004) found the precept, in one 
organization, that in case of trouble, ‘people should not complain about people but to them’. Here, the 
organizational ethic is one of voice: when trouble arises, be open about it and try to work it out together.  
 The availability heuristic, in my interpretation, regulates what we actually attend to, by filtering 
impressions, in emotions that contribute to the selection of frames. If we did not apply such filters, our 
consciousness would likely be overloaded. We cannot afford to pay attention to everything that is 
presented to our senses, and we need to select what appears to be salient and urging attention. Much of 
our conduct is based on routines that are relegated to subsidiary awareness. Then, as discussed earlier, 
we need emotions to catapult attention back into focal awareness when a threat or new opportunity 
emerges. Emotions tend to be stronger when personal desires or interests are at stake than in more 
abstract, impersonal motives. Thus, frames of hedonism and ‘guarding resources’ tend to acquire 
salience more easily than a normative frame (Lindenberg 2003). However, when the desire to ‘act 
appropriately’ is based on emotions of friendship or kinship, it will have greater ‘availability’.  
 As noted before, trust may become routinised, when a relationship has been going well for a while. 
Trustworthiness is taken for granted, until something exceptional arises, in observed behaviour or 
conditions that might yield a temptation or pressure that a partner may not be able to resist. This evokes 
feelings of fear, suspicion or indignation that break routinized trust open to critical scrutiny. Earlier, we 
noted the role of identification in trust, on the basis of shared categories concerning motives and 
conditions of behaviour. Here, availability is based on familiarity. It affects both one’s own 
trustworthiness, in the willingness to make sacrifices for others, and one’s trust, in the tolerance of 
behaviour that deviates from expectations. One will more easily help someone when one can identify 
with his need. One can more easily forgive someone’s breach of trust or reliance when one can identify 
with the lack of competence or the motive that caused it. One can more easily accept the blame for 
oneself. Since one can identify with him, one may sympathize with his action, seeing, perhaps, that his 
action was in fact a just response to one’s own previous actions. One might have reacted in the same 
fashion as he did.  
While it is adaptively rational, the availability heuristic yields several problems. One is that anger 
may overshoot its function of calling attention, and propels impulsive defensive or retaliatory conduct. 
Another problem is that attention is called only by extreme, emotional appeals, so that more subdued, 
nuanced appeals and weak signals tend to be ignored. The availability heuristic yields useful emotional 
triggers to create focal awareness of possible risk in relations, but next one should be careful not to jump 
to conclusions, and to exercise benefit of the doubt wherever possible. This is the case, in particular, 
because when ‘things go wrong’ in a relationship, there may be a multitude of possible causes: an 
accident, lack of resources, lack of competence and opportunism. One may jump to assuming the worst, 
opportunism, while that conclusion is not justified. 
 Anchoring and adjustment indicates that once we select a frame, with corresponding behavioural 
routines, we do not easily drop it. Deutsch (1973) also argued that beginnings are important and may be 
difficult to turn around. He suggested that there is circular causation between characteristics of 
participants and the results of interaction, in his ‘crude law of social relations’: ‘The characteristic 
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processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also 
to elicit that type of social relationship’. Under uncertainty cognition does need such an anchor. Studies 
of learning and adjustment have shown that hasty and large departures from existing practices can yield 
chaotic behaviour (March 1991, Lounamaa and March 1987). It is adaptively rational to experiment with 
small, proximate change, to accumulate motivation for more radical change, as well as insights into 
directions and elements of change that are likely to be viable and worth the upheaval (Nooteboom 2000). 
However, this heuristic also entails risk of inertia: the inability to make needed drastic change in the face 
of a crisis.  
 This heuristic is related to the notion of trust as a default, and routinized trust. The notions of default 
and routine entail that one sticks to an established form of behaviour until new evidence compels its 
change.  
 As already noted, the heuristic of anchoring and adjustment entails that beginnings are often difficult 
to turn around. This relates back to the discussion of how to start a relationship when at the beginning 
there is no basis for trust. If one takes the advice from Lewicki and Bunker to start on the basis of 
control, this may be seen as a sign of distrust, which is not only likely to evoke a similar response, with 
the risk of a vicious circle of control upon control that constrains the scope for flexibility, improvization 
and innovation in the relationship, but may also be difficult to turn into trust as the relationship develops. 
These heuristics appear to complement each other. Representativeness determines how one can 
interpret behaviour, availability determines which interpretation is triggered, and anchoring stabilises 
chosen behavioural routines. Of the three, availability is the most laden with emotion, and 
representativeness is the most concerned with learning. Availability causes frame switches, and 
anchoring and adjustment serves to constrain such switches. The first is needed for guarding survival, the 
latter is needed to make framing less unstable and precarious.   
The notion of a loss versus a gain frame, from prospect theory, has important implications for the 
stability of relationships (Nooteboom 2004). It was noted earlier that one way to start a relationship 
without prior trust is to develop it in a careful balance of mutual dependence. Then, however, the 
problem often is that the balance is broken by a change of conditions, such as a change of technology or 
market whereby existing competences lose relevance, in different degrees for different partners, or the 
emergence in the arena of a new player who yields a more attractive alternative for one of the partners. 
This partner may then want to exit while the other partner wants to hold on to him. Then, the first partner 
is in a gain frame (getting more out of an alternative relationship), while the other is in a loss frame 
(losing a valuable partner). According to the theory, the latter would go to greater extremes, in emotional 
and even self-destructive actions (slander, hopeless litigation), to retain the partner, than the other partner 
would engage in to realise his exit.  
The phenomenon of escalation of commitment also contributes to the stability of a relationship. After 
a relationship has cost an accumulation of sacrifice, it may become increasingly difficult to exit from it, 
since that would suggest that past sacrifices were wasted. Such partnership may quickly unravel under 
new management that is not compromised by past sacrifices.  
In sum, there appear to be three mechanisms for the stabilization of relationships: anchoring, loss 
versus gain, and escalation of commitment.  
Evolutionary psychology claims that in the hunter-gatherer societies in which man evolved, the 
variance of yields, in gathering edible plants, roots, nuts, etc., and even more in hunting, with the 
impossibility to instantly consume large game, together with problems of durable storage, entails an 
evolutionary advantage of reciprocity, in the willingness to surrender part of one’s yield to others in 
need, in the expectation to receive from them when they are successful (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 
212).1 This is enhanced by the supposed ability to assess such willingness among others, in a ‘cheater 
detection mechanism’, and to signal a credible, often emotion-laden threat to sanction lack of 
reciprocity (Frank 1988). This purported natural inclination towards reciprocity would contribute to a 
solution of the problem, discussed before, of how to start a relationship without trust based on prior 
experience, while allowing trust to develop. Presumably, the principle works only under conditions of 
                                                     
1 The argument requires that group selection is viable. In spite of earlier arguments that group selection is 
dominated by individual selection, according to later arguments it can be viable. That is the case if opportunistic 
intruders into a reciprocity-based society are pre-empted before they get a chance to develop reproductive 
advantage (Ridley 1997).  
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stability of communities, where recipients of goodwill will ‘stay around’ to engage in reciprocity. A 
similar condition was discussed for a reputation mechanism. Reciprocity and reputation are mutually 
reinforcing.   
The heuristics have implications not only for starting and adapting a relationship, but also for 
ending one. The ending of relationships is at least as important as the issue of starting one, in view of 
the fact that relationships may last too long, yielding too much identification, resulting in lack of 
cognitive variety for further innovation. Nooteboom (1999, 2004) proposed that there is a hostile and a 
collaborative mode of exit from a relationship. In the hostile mode, one would try to prepare one’s 
exit, no longer engaging in relation-specific investments, retrieving hostages, and building up 
investments in a new relationship, as surreptitiously as one can, and then spring a surprise exit on the 
partner, who is left with the unforeseen damage of worthless specific investments and a discontinuity 
in production. In the collaborative mode, in a ‘voice mode of exit’, one would announce one’s 
intentions towards exit ahead of time, help the partner to disentangle the relationship with minimum 
damage, and help to find a replacement. The advantage of the latter mode would be that the partner is 
less in a loss frame, and hence less likely to take radical actions of binding and retaliation. A risk, 
however, is that the partner would have more time and opportunity to take such actions. Here, the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic also kicks in. If the relationship had been collaborative, based on 
benevolence, that would set the norm, and a hostile mode of exit would constitute a greater shock than 
in a more calculative relationship, with greater risks of extreme retaliatory behaviour.      
In sum, the decision heuristics and other phenomena from social and evolutionary psychology are highly 
relevant to the development of trust, because they affect attribution of characteristics, expectations of 




A central claim of this paper is that for an understanding of how trust is built up and broken down, and 
how trust can go beyond calculative self-interest without becoming blind or unconditional, we may profit 
from the application of framing theory and decision heuristics derived from social psychology. They are 
consistent with the perspective of embodied cognition, and yield an elaboration of it. In particular, they 
elaborate the idea that rationality and emotions are interwined, and that psychological mechanisms arise 
from conduct that is selected for survival. In this article, an attempt was made to combine framing theory 
and decision heuristics. A frame is an intentional stance, guiding perception and action, which focuses on 
a limited number of a range of possible other-directed or self-interested goals or motives. At any moment 
one frame tends to be salient while others are subsidiary, and perceptions of events may cause switches. 
 This helps to understand the limits of trust. Decision heuristics help to explain how this happens. The 
following heuristics are discussed: 
- The representativeness heuristic 
- The availability heuristic 
- The anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
- The phenomenon of escalation of commitment 
- The phenomenon of cognitive dissonance 
- The notion of a loss frame versus a gain frame 
- The notion of an instinct for reciprocity, combined with a cheater detection mechanism 
 The representativeness heuristic was interpreted as yielding a repertoire of possible frames and 
behavioural routines, constituting a cognitive repertoire, in the form of prototypes, in terms of which 
judgements of (un)trustworthiness are made and translated into action. The availability heuristic was 
interpreted as determining which frames are salient and which are subsidiary, and how switching 
between them occurs. This is governed by emotions and by familiarity. Emotions serve to break 
behavioural routines open for scrutiny. On the other hand, the heuristic of anchoring and adjustment, 
escalation of commitment, and the notion of a loss versus a gain frame serve to stabilise behaviour. 
Anchoring and adjustment clarify why it may be difficult to turn suspicion around into trust and why it is 
difficult to take a hostile, abrupt approach to exit if the relationship was based on benevolence and voice. 
The notion of an instinct towards reciprocity helps to start a relationship in which there is no prior trust 
based on experience.  
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 Here also we find paradoxes. These heuristics and phenomena are adaptively rational, given bounded 
rationality and the pressure to survive under conditions of radical uncertainty and the need for speedy 
response. However, they can yield irrational actions, in prejudice, blindness, injustice, inertia, lack of 
adaptiveness under crises, and impulsive behaviour. They help to enable and support the building of 
trust, but may also prevent it, and may cause unjustified breakdowns of trust. 
 A recurrent theme in the process of trust is openness, in a voice based approach. The importance of 
that was argued earlier by Zand (1972). Since there may be many causes of disappointed expectations, it 
is important to be open about problems that one may cause to a partner. Silence until the problem 
becomes manifest is likely to be interpreted as a sign of the worst possibility of opportunistic behaviour. 
An imposition of control and requisite monitoring has adverse effects, indicated before, of a vicious 
circle of control that blocks scope for learning and innovation, and starts a relation on a footing of 
mistrust that may be difficult to turn around. If, on the other hand, one voluntarily accepts or even invites 
some control by the partner, and opens up to monitoring, this greatly facilitates trust building. This 
indicates the importance of voluntary transparency for trust relationships. A timely announcement of 
intentions to exit may greatly help to disentangle relationships without too much damage. If one shies 
away from exhibiting one’s fears of relational risk, one thereby robs the partner of the opportunity to 
reduce that risk. 
 While some progress may have been made in this article, in the attempt at a coherent account of the 
trust process, in a combination of framing theory and decision heuristics, there is need for further 
research, analysing in more detail how the different psychological mechanisms mesh and compensate or 
conflict, and how this depends on details of interaction and on social contexts, such as organizational 
culture and institutional environments. There is much scope and need for further empirical research, to 
test and revise the many conjectures developed in this article. In cognitive science, research in embodied 
cognition may investigate the neural correlates or underpinnings of the psychological mechanisms 
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Table 1  Sources of (intentional) reliability  
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   macro;    micro; 
   universalistic  particularistic, relation-specific 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
self-interest 
opportunity control  contracts, legal enforcement hierarchy, managerial ‘fiat’, 
 
incentive control             reputation  dependence: unique partner 
 value, switching costs, hostages  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
altruism  values, social norms of proper empathy, routinization, 
benevolence   conduct,, moral obligation,  identification, affect, friendship 
   sense of duty, bonds of  kinship      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 









       Emotions:  
social emotions: sympathy, embarrassment, shame, guilt, pride, jealousy, envy, 
 gratitude, admiration, indignation, contempt, … 
primary emotions: fear, anger, disgust, surprise, sadness, happiness, … 
background emotions (state of being): enthusiasm, edginess, excitement, tranquillity, .. 
       ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Drives (appetites): 
  Hunger, thirst, curiosity and exploration, play, sex, .. 
       ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Pain and pleasure: 
  Yielding reflexes of withdrawal, attraction, protection, expression of alarm 
       ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Immune response 
       Basic reflexes: 
  Startle reflex, .. 
       Metabolic regulation: 
        Endocrine/hormonal secretions, muscular contraction (heart, digestion, ..), heart rate,  
  breathing, blood pressure, storage and deployment of proteins and carbohydrates, … 
       -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
       Adopted from Damasio (2003). 
 
 
